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Over the past four years, the increase in terror attacks and the influx of refugees has 
created a crisis of secularism in many parts of Western Europe (Modood 2012:5; Torpey 
2010:288). This is the result of what Modood (2012:6) describes as the reversal of population 
flows of European colonialism. At the same time, the presence of religion in many Western 
European countries, while still evident, has become increasingly invisible. The gradual secular 
nature of many Western European countries, alongside an increasing presence of Muslims 
settling in these nations, has contributed to this so-called identity crisis. Consequently, there has 
been recent attempts to prevent the use of overt symbols of religiosity in open spaces (Modood 
2015:5). This was evident within the recent attempts in France to ban the burqa, and the even 
more recent “burkini” ban (Davis 2011:119). This paper attempts to question whether this 
Islamophobic rhetoric that has become widespread throughout Western Europe and the United 
States is a result of the increasingly secular nature of many countries within the Western world, 
and whether gender plays a role in this relationship. Most of the existing literature that questions 
the relationship between secularism and Islamophobia focuses solely on the relationship within 
the context of France and other Western European countries. However, it is important to question 
whether this relationship between Islamophobia and secularism exists in the United States, a 
country which simultaneously contains a secular and a strong religious presence.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 In order to understand whether secularism has played a role in the increasingly prevalent 
Islamophobic rhetoric within Western Europe and the United States, a conceptualization of  
Islamophobia is needed. Put simply, Islamophobia is described as the stereotypical 
generalizations about Islam and Muslims that can result in discrimination or harassment 
(Moosavi 2015:41). Hatred against Muslims appears in both overt and subtle forms. When 
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speaking of Islamophobia, most think of overt discrimination taking the form of physical abuse. 
However, the subtle and less transparent forms of Islamophobia are equally as important, 
through which Muslims are confronted with hostility and exclusion in their day-to-day lives, 
without it being obvious (Moosavi 2015:48). Additionally, a number of scholars have 
emphasized the historical roots of Islamophobia rather than framing it as a new phenomenon 
(Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:2; Kayaglu 2012:611; Soyer 2013:400).  
Historical Roots of Islamophobia 
Islam has been categorized as “other” or inferior to other religions since the 1400s 
(Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:2; Kayaglu 2012:611). The struggle between Christian Spain and 
Islam formed part of a longer imperial battle in the Mediterranean that dates back to the 
crusades. In 1492, the Christian Spanish monarchy re-conquered Islamic Spain, forcing Jews and 
Arab Muslims from the area, while simultaneously “discovering” the Americas and conquering 
various parts of the world (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:2). As a result, a division of labor was 
created, privileging populations of European origin over the rest. At the same time, Jews and 
Muslims became the internal “Other” within Europe (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:2; Soyer 
2013:402; Mingolo 2006:18). In the late 15
th
 century, Jews and Muslims were divided even 
further and were classified as practicing the “wrong religion,” placing them as “savage” and 
“primitive” people. Grosfoguel and Mielants (2006:8) describe this as the subalternization and 
inferiorization of Islam, based on the idea of “pure blood.” This classification promoted the idea 
that Islamic civilizations were inferior and uncivilized. However, Andalusian, Mughal, and 
Ottoman experiences show that Islamic civilizations were more structured and refined than 
Western nations (Şentürk and Nizamuddin 2008:519). This category of “otherness” has 
continued to grow and has transformed into a type of cultural racism that frames itself in terms of 
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inferior habits, beliefs, behaviors, or values of a group of people (Grosfoguel and Mielants 
2006:4). What is seen as the “right” religion is those only supported by a Judeo-Christian culture, 
and what is seen as “inhuman” follows from a departure of that culture (Butler 2008:12). 
Islamophobia continues to be framed in this way; transformed as a type of colonial racism to a 
newly formed cultural racism that targets Muslims as being inherently different and inferior to 
white Europeans. While Islamophobia is a form of discrimination against Muslims, it is 
important to understand the ways in which gender plays a role within this form of cultural racism 
as well.  
Muslim Women and Islamophobia 
 The intersection of religion and gender is important to discuss when conceptualizing 
discrimination against Muslims. Veiled women living in Western Europe have been increasingly 
classified as inferior because of the overt “Islamic marker” that they wear (Afshar 2008:421). 
While all Muslims are subjected to forms of discrimination, Muslim women’s experiences 
should be categorized as a different form of exclusion that is not only based on race and religion, 
but also gender. The discrimination faced by Muslim women takes both physical and subtle 
forms. Drawing off of Edward Said’s iconic work, it is important to conceptualize the subtle 
forms of discrimination faced by Muslim women as orientalism (Said 1978:10). This form of 
discrimination operates through the eroticization of Muslim women (Said 1978:10; Afshar 
2008:421). If Muslim women are not seen as threatening, they are perceived as being exotic and 
submissive to their faith (Afshar 2008:421). These assumptions promote the idea that the West 
must rush to liberate Muslim women from the "oppression" that is imposed on them by their 
faith (Abu-Lughod 2002:789; Afshar 2008:420). This white “savior” mentality and the image of 
Muslim women as being “oppressed” works to justify cultural racism that ultimately targets 
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Muslims, constructing them as “inferior” and “uncivilized” people who do not belong in the 
West (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:6). The headscarf, in particular, plays an important role in 
the construction of this imagery because it is seen as a "subversive force when it emerges in the 
secular public sphere, asserting its own unconventional and nonsecular (Islamic) norms of 
privacy" (Çindar 2008:903). As a result, when Muslim women wear headscarves in public 
spaces, the piece of clothing imposes an Islamic frame and labels the women as being inherently 
different, and therefore a threat to secularism (Çindar 2008:903). The increasingly secular nature 
of Western Europe and the United States may have further promoted this cultural racism that 
classifies Islam as being incompatible with the West.  
Secularism  
Peter Berger’s (2012) revised secularization theory helps conceptualize the ways in 
which secularism is framed within many Western European countries and in the United States as 
well. Berger (2012:313) argues that while there are many forms that secularism can take, it 
operates through a decline of religion. This decline of religion is experienced on both micro and 
macro levels, encompassing not only individuals being less religious, but also social institutions 
separating themselves from religion as well (Berger 2012:314). Berger argues that, “There is 
indeed a secular discourse resulting from modernity, but it can coexist with religious discourses 
that are not secular at all” (2012:314). This idea is extremely applicable to the United States 
formation of secularism that coexists with religious discourses at the same time.   
Other scholars have questioned the relationship between secularism and Islamophobia, 
specifically within Western European countries (Torpey 2010:280; Modood 2011:5). There are 
two ways of looking at secularism that have been previously overlooked: active and latent 
religiosity (Torpey 2010:280). Active religiosity refers to people who practice their religions in 
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public spheres. Conversely, latent religiosity manifests itself more subtly (Torpey 2010:280). 
This latent form of religion can spark an identity crisis when confronted with groups that practice 
their religions openly as a result of the increasing secular nature of many parts of Western 
Europe (Modood 2011:5). For example, surveys in London show that immigrant groups that 
settle in London become increasingly secular, while for Muslims, the reverse tendency applies 
(Laitin 2010:431). Consequently, some Europeans question whether or not Muslims should be 
allowed to practice their religions openly in a country that emphasizes secular values (Laitin 
2010:431).  
In order to understand the relationship between secularism and Islamophobia within the 
context of the United States, this paper draws on Annalisa Frisina’s (2010) two frameworks of 
Islamophobia: the new orientalist and security frames. The new orientalist framework is related 
to the work cited above, portraying Islam as the cultural and religious opposite of the West, 
therefore classifying it as incompatible to Western values and cultures (Frisina 2010:560). 
Additionally, the security frame is important because it is based on a sort of shifting form of 
orientalism that promotes ideas of Muslims as dangerous because they are likely to be 
“terrorists” (Frisina 2010:560). In this case, Islamophobia is most often justified due to this idea 
that Muslims are a threat to “national security” (Frisina 2010:560). While the literature I have 
included above are extensive investigations on secularism and its relationship with Islamophobia, 
only a few sources discuss secularism and Islamophobia in the United States. Drawing from the 
literature above, this paper attempts to understand the relationship between secularism and 
Islamophobia in the United States utilizing quantitative data analysis.  
RESEARCH METHODS  
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 This research is based on the data provided by the Public Religion Research Institute's 
(PRRI) survey on Pluralism-Immigration-&-Civic-Integration, conducted in 2011 (PRRI 2011). 
The data set is composed of a random sample of American adults, 18 years or older, totaling 
2,450 respondents. The unit of analysis in this data set is individuals. The data was collected 
through phone interviews under the supervision of Directions in Research. The responses were 
weighted in two stages. The first stage of weighting corrected for different probabilities of 
selection associated with the number of adults in each household and telephone usage patterns of 
each respondent (PRRI 2011). Additionally, in the second stage sample, demographics were 
balanced by form to match target population parameters for gender, age, education, race, region, 
population density, and telephone usage (PRRI 2011). The margin of error is +/-2.0 percentage 
points for the general sample at the 95 percent confidence interval. Additionally, the response 
rate is 5.67 percent (PRRI 2011). The survey asked questions about political climate in the 
United States, including questions about discrimination, September 11
 
attacks, religion, and 
questions about race. For more information about data collection, see the 2011 Pluralism-
Immigration-&-Civic-Integration online. 
Independent Variable 
 Using the Pluralism-Immigration-&-Civic-Integration Survey, I formed the independent 
variable from the question that asks whether one completely agrees, mostly agrees, mostly 
disagrees, or completely disagrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state. I 
used this variable to operationalize secularism, which takes the form of the separation of church 
and state in the United States. I recoded this variable to give the highest value to a respondent 
who completely agrees with maintaining a separation of church and state. The coding of the 
variable follows this order: completely disagree (1), mostly disagree (2), mostly agree (3), and 
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completely agree (4). Additionally, I used three dependent variables to measure discrimination 
against Muslims and Muslim women.  
Dependent Variables 
 The first dependent variable asks whether someone completely agrees, mostly agrees, 
mostly disagrees, or completely disagrees that the values of Islam, the Muslim religion, are at 
odds with American values and culture. I used this variable to operationalize a form of 
Islamophobia because it relates to the idea that Islam is incompatible to Western values, and 
therefore, justifies the exclusion of Muslims. I also had to recode this variable to make 
completely agree the highest value. The coding of the variable follows this order: completely 
disagree (1), mostly disagree (2), mostly agree (3), and completely agree (4).  
The second dependent variable asks whether someone is very comfortable, somewhat 
comfortable, somewhat uncomfortable, or very uncomfortable with a mosque being built near 
their home. I used this variable to operationalize a form of Islamophobia based on the security 
frame that labels Muslims as threats to democracy and secularism. If people believe that 
Muslims are threats and are incompatible with American values, they may feel uncomfortable 
with mosques being built near their homes. I did not recode this variable because the highest 
value measures feeling very uncomfortable. The coding of the variable follows this order: very 
comfortable (1), somewhat comfortable (2), somewhat uncomfortable (3), and very 
uncomfortable (4).  
The last dependent variable asks whether someone is very comfortable, somewhat 
comfortable, somewhat uncomfortable, or very uncomfortable with Muslim women wearing 
clothing that covers their whole bodies, including their faces. I used this variable to 
operationalize another form of Islamophobia. When people see the Islamic veil on Muslim 
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women, they may feel uncomfortable around them due to the perception of Muslims as threats 
and as inherently different to Western forms of modernity. The coding of the last dependent 
variable follows this order: very comfortable (1), somewhat comfortable (2), somewhat 
uncomfortable (3), very uncomfortable (4).  
Control Variables 
In addition to the independent variable and the three dependent variables, I included two 
control variables in the analysis. The first control variable is religion because I wanted to know 
whether a respondents' religious affiliation has an effect on their perceptions of Muslims. I 
dummied this variable to measure whether someone is Roman Catholic (1) or not Roman 
Catholic (0). It was necessary for me to categorize the religion variable as Roman Catholic or not 
in order to achieve an 80 to 20 percent distribution. Respondents who reported not being Roman 
Catholic consisted of people who identified as Protestant, Mormon, Orthodox, Jewish, Buddhist, 
Hindu, Christian, Unitarian, Atheist, Agnostic, nothing in particular, and something else. I 
excluded Muslims, which consisted of only seven cases from the analysis because I wanted to 
know how non-Muslims felt about Muslims in the United States.  
The second control variable was age because it is said that older generations hold 
strongly to religious beliefs, while younger generations have more secular beliefs. The survey’s 
age range is from 18 to 94 years (PRRI 2011). Through the analysis, most of the variables I used 
are ordinal variables. As a result, I understand that I am violating assumptions by treating 
ordinal-level variables as interval level.  
FINDINGS 
Table 1 reports the means, medians, and standard deviations for all of the variables. The 
distribution of the independent variable can be seen in Figure 1. The histogram shows that about 
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70 percent of the respondents reported that they agree with the separation of church and state, 
suggesting that a majority of the respondents favor having a strict separation of church and state 
in the United States. Table 1 also reports that the mean is 2.9 and the median is three. This 
suggests that the average level of agreement and the middle value is mostly agreeing with 
maintaining a strict separation of church and state. The standard deviation for the independent 
variable is one, meaning that there is slight deviation in the variable, however, the standard 
deviation is close to zero making the mean more reliable.  
 
Table 1: Means, Medians, and Standard Deviations for All Variables 
Variables Mean Median SD (N) 
Separation of Church and State   2.93 3.0 1.028 (2097) 
Islam at odds with Amer. values    2.55 3.0 0.991 (2033) 
Mosque being built near home   2.55 3.0 1.115 (2078) 
Muslim women covering bodies   2.51 3.0 1.102 (2102) 
Roman Catholic/ Not   0.75 1.0 0.432 (2134) 
Age 53.25             55.0     18.777 (2134) 
 
 
Figure 1. Histogram of “We Must Maintain a Strict Separation of Church and State”  
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 The survey asked the respondents' level of agreement with the question, "Islam is at odds 
with American values and culture." The distribution of the variable can be seen in Figure 2. The 
histogram shows that there is almost an even number of respondents who agree with the above 
statement and the number of respondents who disagree with the above statement. This suggests 
that respondents both disagree and agree that Islam is at odds with the values and culture of the 
United States. Additionally, Table 1 reports that the mean of this dependent variable is 2.6, 
which shows that the average level of agreement is mostly agreeing with Islam being at odds 
with American values and culture. Table 1 also reports that the standard deviation of this 
dependent variable is one. Since the standard deviation is close to zero, there is slight distribution 
in the variable, but not significant skew. Also, the standard deviation suggests that the mean is 
more reliable.  
 
Figure 2. Histogram of Islam at Odds with American Values and Culture 
Additionally, the survey asked the respondents' level of comfort with "A mosque being 
built near your home." Figure 3 shows the distribution of respondents who felt comfortable or 
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uncomfortable with a mosque being built near their homes. There is an even distribution between 
respondents who felt comfortable about a mosque being built near their home and respondents 
who felt uncomfortable. Table 1 also reports the mean of this dependent variable as 2.6, 
suggesting the average level of comfort is somewhat uncomfortable with a mosque being built 
near their home. The median is two, which means that the middle value is somewhat comfortable 
with a mosque being built near their home. The standard deviation is 1.1, which shows that there 
is slight distribution in the variable, but the standard deviation makes the mean more reliable 
because it is close to zero. 
 
Figure 3. Histogram of Mosque Built Near Home 
The survey asked the respondents' level of comfort to the question, "Muslim women 
wearing clothing that covers their whole body, including their faces." Figure 4 shows that there is 
an even distribution of the respondents' who feel comfortable and uncomfortable with the above 
statement. The percentage of respondents who are comfortable is almost equal to the percentage 
of respondents who are uncomfortable with Muslim women covering their bodies, including 
their faces. Table 1 reports the mean for this variable as 2.5 while the median is three, suggesting 
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that the average level of comfort is somewhat uncomfortable with Muslim women covering their 
bodies, including their faces. The standard deviation is reported as 1.1, which shows that the 
mean is reliable and there is only slight distribution in the variable.  
              
Figure 4. Histogram of Muslim Women Covering their Bodies 
 The survey asked about the respondents' religious affiliation. I dummied this variable and 
only showed which respondents identified as being Roman Catholic and which respondents 
identified as something else. Around 25 percent of the respondents identified as Roman Catholic, 
while about 75 percent of the respondents identified as not being Roman Catholic. Table 1 shows 
that the mean for the control variable is .24, meaning that most of the respondents are not Roman 
Catholic. Additionally, the standard deviation of this control variable is .43, suggesting that there 
is little deviation and the mean is more reliable since the standard deviation is close to zero.  
 The survey also asked a question about the age of the respondents. The survey consists of 
adults ranging from 18 to 94 years. Figure 6 shows the distribution of respondents' ages, 
suggesting that most of the respondents were between 50 to 70 years old. About ten percent of 
the respondents are 80 years and older. Additionally, about twenty-five percent of the 
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respondents are 20 to 40 years old. Table 1 reports that the average age of the respondents is 53. 
The median age is about 54, and the standard deviation is 18 years. The standard deviation 
suggests that the respondents’ ages ranged from 34 to 72, which makes up about 60 percent of 
the respondents. Because the standard deviation is 18, there is significant skew in the variable.  
 
Figure 5. Histogram of Age 
Bivariate Results 
 Table 2 shows the results of the bivariate analysis between the dependent variables, 
independent variable, and control variables. The bivariate results indicate a moderate, positive, 
statistically significant relationship (r = .324) between the two dependent variables, indicating 
that the more a respondent agrees that Islam is at odds with American values and culture, the 
more uncomfortable a respondent feels with a mosque being near their home. Additionally, the 
bivariate results indicate a weak to moderate, positive, statistically significant relationship (r = 
.225) with the other dependent variable, suggesting that the more a respondent agrees that Islam 
is at odds with American values and culture, the more uncomfortable a respondent feels with 
Muslim women covering their bodies including their faces. The bivariate results also indicate a 
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moderate to strong, positive, statistically significant relationship (r = .494) between the other two 
dependent variables, suggesting that the more uncomfortable a respondent feels with a mosque 
being built near their home, the more uncomfortable they feel with Muslim women covering 
their bodies, including their faces.  
In terms of the first dependent variable (Islam at odds) and the independent variable, 
Table 2 indicates a weak, negative, statistically significant relationship (r = -.130), suggesting 
that the more a respondent agrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state, 
the more a respondent disagrees with Islam being at odds with American values and culture. For 
the second dependent variable, which asks respondents’ level of comfort with a mosque being 
built near their home, the bivariate results indicate a weak, negative, moderate, and statistically 
significant relationship (r = -.271), suggesting that the more a respondent agrees that we must 
maintain a strict separation of church and state, the more comfortable a respondent feels with a 
mosque being built near their home. Additionally, the bivariate results indicate that there is a 
negative, weak, and statistically significant relationship (r = -.101), between the third dependent 
variable, Muslim women covering their bodies, and the independent variable. As a result, the 
more a respondent agrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state, the more 
comfortable a respondent feels with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces.  
Table 2. Correlations (r) between Separation of Church and State and Dependent Variables 
(listwise deletion, two-tailed test, N=1932) 
Variables Mosque Covering Church and 
State 
Roman 
Catholic 
Age 
Islam at odds .322** .226**  .129** -.067** .106** 
Mosque  .496** -.270**  .036 .243** 
Covering Bodies    .101** -.014 .242** 
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Church and State    -.043  .020 
Roman Catholic     -.045 
** p < .01 
 
 Table 2 shows the bivariate results for the control variables as well. The bivariate results 
indicate no relationship between respondents who are Roman Catholic and whether a respondent 
agrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state. The Roman Catholic 
variable has no relationship with a respondents’ level of comfort with a mosque being built near 
their home and with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. However, the 
bivariate results indicate a negative, weak, statistically significant relationship (r = -.067) 
between one of the dependent variables, suggesting that if a respondent is Roman Catholic, the 
respondent is less likely to agree that Islam is at odds with American values and culture.  
 The bivariate results indicate statistically significant relationships between the three 
dependent variables and respondents’ ages. Table 2 shows that there is a weak, positive, 
statistically significant relationship (r = .106) between age and the Islam at odds variable, 
suggesting that the older a respondent is, the more the respondent agrees that Islam is at odds 
with American values and culture. Additionally, the bivariate results indicate a weak but almost 
moderate, positive, statistically significant relationship (r = .243) between age and a 
respondents’ level of comfort with a mosque being built near their home, meaning that the older 
a respondent is, the more uncomfortable they feel with a mosque being built near their home. 
Lastly, the bivariate results in Table 2 indicate a strong, weak but almost moderate, positive, and 
statistically significant relationship (r = .242) between age and Muslim women covering their 
bodies, suggesting that the older a respondent is, the more uncomfortable the respondent feels 
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with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. The bivariate results indicate 
no relationship between age and whether a respondent agrees that we must maintain a strict 
separation of church and state.  
Multivariate Findings 
The multiple regression analysis reported in Table 3 shows that 3.3 percent of the 
variance in the separation of church and state, while holding constant Roman Catholic and age, is 
explained by a respondents’ level of agreement with Islam being at odds with American values 
and culture. Additionally, the multiple regression demonstrates that 13 percent of the variance in 
a respondents’ agreement with the separation of church and state, while holding constant Roman 
Catholic and age, is explained by a respondents’ level of comfort with a mosque being built near 
their homes. Lastly, the multiple regression portrays that 6.5 percent of the variance in a 
respondents’ level of agreement with the separation of church and state, while holding constant 
Roman Catholic and age, is explained by a respondents’ level of comfort with Muslim women 
covering their bodies, including their faces. While the R squared values are small, the F-test 
shows that all three of the regressions are significant.  Of the three dependent variables, the 
independent variable has the most effect on a respondents' level of comfort with a mosque being 
built near their home (Beta = -.266). The independent variable has the second strongest effect on 
a respondents' level of agreement with Islam being at odds with American values and culture 
(Beta = -.127). Additionally, the independent variable has the least effect on the level of comfort 
with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces (Beta = -.097).  
  The first control variable, whether a respondent is Roman Catholic, is only significant 
with one of the dependent variables, a respondents’ level of agreement with Islam at odds with 
American values and culture (Beta = -.070). While Roman Catholic is only significant with one 
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dependent variable, the second control variable, age, is significant with all three dependent 
variables. Age has the most effect on a respondents’ level of comfort with a mosque being built 
near their home (Beta = .249). Additionally, age has the second strongest effect on a 
respondents’ level of comfort with Muslim women covering their bodies (Beta = .239). Age has 
the least effect on a respondents’ level of agreement with Islam being at odds with American 
values and culture (Beta = .113).  
Table 3. Regression of Dependent Variables and Separation of Church and State, Roman 
Catholic, and Respondent’s Age 
 
p < .01 
DISCUSSION 
 These findings are not consistent with the large body of literature on the relationship 
between secularism and Islamophobia in Western Europe. Secularism does in fact have a 
relationship with Islamophobia, but within the context of the United States, the relationship is 
negative. The results suggest that the more secular an individual is, the more open they are to 
Muslims being in the country. The results specifically report that the more a respondent agrees 
with the separation of church and state, the less they agree that Islam is at odds with American 
values and culture. Additionally, the more a respondent agrees with the separation of church and 
state, the more comfortable a respondent feels with a mosque being built near their homes and 
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with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. This may be due to the fact that 
while there is an increase in secularism in the United States, religion still has a strong presence 
within the country. 
Berger (2012:4) describes this phenomenon by saying that secularism coexists with 
religion in the United States. In fact, he goes against his former theory of secularism by stating 
that with modernity comes pluralism. Berger (2012:4) states that Western Europe is unique 
because the countries were created by a state church, where the two were not separate, whereas 
the United States started out with pluralism (Berger 2012:4). As a result, people with secular 
values can be religious at the same time, because the form that secularism takes in the United 
States is based on promoting liberty for citizens to practice religions freely. While the United 
States promotes freedom for practicing religions, pluralization can become a challenge when 
there are too many different forms of religions that coexist in a single space (Modood 2012:5). 
As a result, when Muslims are viewed through this oriental frame and are seen as a threat, non-
Muslims may feel conflicted when they are exposed to Muslims practicing their religions in the 
public sphere (Modood 2012:5).  
The multivariate results also report that age forms a positive relationship with all of the 
dependent variables. The older a respondent is, the more a respondent agrees that Islam is at odds 
with American values and culture, the more uncomfortable a respondent is with a mosque being 
built near their home, and with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. 
Older generations may hold increasingly prejudiced beliefs against Muslims due to the ways in 
which Islam has been portrayed throughout the United States. Additionally, it may be because 
the Muslim population has increased in recent years and older generations may not have been 
exposed to Muslims practicing their religions openly. As a result, older generations may rely 
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more on stereotypical beliefs of Muslims. The multivariate findings show that the Roman 
Catholic variable is related to only one of the dependent variables (Islam at Odds), suggesting 
that if a respondent is Roman Catholic, they are less likely to believe that Islam is incompatible 
with American values and culture. This may be due to the fact that Roman Catholics are diverse 
and come from other parts of the world. While Roman Catholicism is not the biggest religious 
sect in the United States, Roman Catholics make up about 22 percent of the United States 
population (PRRI 2011). Additionally, younger generations of Roman Catholics may have been 
raised in households where Roman Catholic values have been passed down. As a result, they 
may be more accepting of Muslims.  
 While the results turned out to show a negative relationship with variables that 
operationalized Islamophobia, the bivariate results portray that Islamophobia is prevalent in the 
United States. In fact, each variable that operationalized Islamophobia was positively and almost 
moderately related to one another. As a result, the new oriental and security frames apply in the 
context of the United States. Through the new orientalist frame, the main reason why Muslims 
experience discrimination is because of the idea that Islam is incompatible with Western forms 
of modernity (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:4; Frisina 2010:560). The security frame 
perpetuates the belief that Muslims are threats to American democracy (Frisina 2010:560). These 
two frames can create the perception that the Islamic headscarf is threatening and places Muslim 
women as cultural inferior because it is a “subversive force” when it appears in the public sphere 
(Çindar 2008:903). Similarly, mosques can be perceived as threating in Western Europe and the 
United States because Islam is seen as the cultural opposite of Western cultures and values, 
therefore people can react negatively to mosques and may feel uncomfortable having one built 
near their home. Afshar (2008:413) states, “Clearly Orientalism is not merely part of a forgotten 
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past; it remains very much at the core of the current history of race and gender in the West and 
current wars in the Middle East.” The perception of Muslim women as uncivilized and 
“oppressed” has been used to justify United States’ foreign policy and ongoing interference in 
the Middle East (Afshar 2008:415; Abu-Lughod 2002:789). Islamophobia is continuously 
justified in the United States because of the depiction of Muslims as “backward” and threats to 
national security (Frisina 2010:560). 
CONCLUSION 
 In this paper, I attempted to understand the relationship between Islamophobia and 
secularism within the context of the United States, and tried to see how gender plays a role in 
this relationship. I also attempted to conceptualize how Islamophobia functions through Frisina’s 
(2010) new orientalist and security frames. Using the data from the 2011 Pluralism-Immigration-
&-Civic-Integration survey created by the Public Religion Research Institute, the proceeding 
analysis displayed a negative relationship between a respondents’ level of agreement with 
maintaining a strict separation of church and state and a respondents’ level of agreement with 
Islam being at odds with American values and culture. Additionally, the analysis showed a 
negative relationship between a respondents’ level of agreement with maintaining a strict 
separation of church and state and whether a respondent was uncomfortable with a mosque being 
built near their home, and with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. 
Secularism in the United States is particular in that it promotes the separation of church and state 
but there continues to be a strong religious presence within the country. Consequently, this may 
have played a role in the negative relationship between secularism and Islamophobia in the 
United States displayed in the multivariate analysis.  
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While this paper portrays important implications regarding the ways in which 
Islamophobia functions in the United States, there were a number of limitations in this study. 
One important limitation is the data set that was used. The data set had a very small response rate 
of 5.67%, which means that it may not be generalizable to the United States population. 
Consequently, further research using a different data set is needed in order to formulate results 
that are generalizable to the United States population. Another limitation has to do with the type 
of variables that were used in this study. Because I used data provided by the Public Religious 
Research Institute, the type of questions asked were out of my control. I used ordinal variables, 
and as a result, had to make assumptions regarding the responses that were reported in the 
survey. While there are limitations in this paper, the results provide an important insight on the 
ways in which Islamophobia functions in the United States.  
While the results showed that there was a negative relationship between secularism and 
Islamophobia, the results displayed the fact that Islamophobia has a presence in the United 
States. In light of recent political events that have taken place in the country, it is important to 
think about Islamophobia not solely as hatred against Muslims due to the idea that they pose a 
threat to security and democracy, but also to view Islamophobic rhetoric as directly related to 
orientalist ideas that depict Muslims as “backward” and “uncivilized.” For example, when 
thinking of Islamophobia through these two frameworks, it is easier to understand why and how 
the recent Travel Ban in the United States was justified. Most of the discourse surrounding this 
ban was on the idea that Muslims from “certain countries” should be restricted from entering the 
United States due to national security reasons (Laughland 2017). However, embedded within this 
rhetoric are orientalist tropes that depict Muslims as “backward” and “uncivilized” people that 
are incompatible with the United States’ form of democracy and secularism. In order to 
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understand the ways in which Islamophobic rhetoric functions within the two frames, placing 
Islamophobia in a historical context is essential (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:3). Additionally, 
thinking about gender and the way it intersects with Islamophobia emphasizes the need to 
challenge Western feminist discourse that reproduces the image of a “Muslim women” as one 
that needs “saving” (Abu-Lughod 2002:784). If we continue to think of how Islamophobia 
operates through the new orientalist and security frames that are often deployed to justify 
discrimination and the exclusion of Muslims, we will be able to challenge Islamophobic rhetoric 
and create a more understanding and open community.  
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